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IN THE SUPRE.ME, COURT 
of the 
SITATE O.F UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF· THE ESTATE 
OF 
GERTRUDE LOUISE RICHARDS, 
Deceased, 
CATHERINE R. HOWELL, 
CATHERINE S. CRESS and 
CHARLES RICHARD SCHNEIDER, 
0 ontestants and Respondents, Case No. 8452 
-vs.-
JANET R. PARKER, 
Proponent and Appellant, 
WALKER BANI( & TRUST 
COMPANY, 
Executor. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING OF PROPONENT 
AND APPELLANT, JANET R. PARKER 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND 
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH: 
The proponent and appellant, Janet R. Parker, re-
spectfully petitions this Court for a rehearing on its 
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opinion issued in the above entitled cause on the 16th 
day of May, 1956. The petition is based upon the fol-
lowing grounds : 
1. The decision vitiates the legislative intent and 
overrules the decisions of this Court relating to sub-
scribing witnesses. 
2. The Court improperly applied the rule that the 
prevailing parties are entitled to have all of the evidence 
and the inferences fairly drawn viewed in a light most 
favorable to them. 
3. The Court erred in holding that the opinions of 
the subscribing witnesses and of an attorney were not 
entitled to undue weight. 
4. The Court erred in holding admissible conjec-
tural testimony by an expert not having personal ob-
serwvation and its application of the rule as to the bur-
den of proof. 
The attorneys for the proponent and appellant here-
by certify that this petition for rehearing is made in 
good faith and not for the purpose of delay. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICH.A.RDS, niATTSSON & EVANS 
Attorneys for Proponent and Appellant 
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ARGUMENT 
The argument in the above entitled matter w,as made 
before this Court on the 11th day of April, 1956, and the 
opinion was filed on ~Iay 16, 1956. We feel that there 
are several serious questions which must be brought to 
the attention of the Court which, in our opinion, cast 
serious doubt upon prior decisions of this Court and the 
validity of wills .and other test4,mentary documents. We 
take it that the doctrine of stare decisis has not been re-
pudiated and that counsel may look to the decisions of 
this Court as precedents, having the force and in all 
respects the dignity of law. 
This Court has in every decision, with practically 
no variation in the language used, stated the rule by 
which mental competency is determined. If there is no 
substantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably 
find the ultimate facts required by the rule, then this 
Court has as much duty to reverse as it does to sustain 
in a case vvhere there is substantial evidence to sustain 
the finding. In Re Swan's Estate, 51 Utah 410, 170 P. 452. 
POINT I. 
THE DECISION VITIATES THE LEGISLATIVE IN-
TENT AND OVERRULES THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT 
RELATING TO SUBSCRIBING WITNESSES. 
The execution and attestation of wills is the most 
formal and mandatory act in our law. It is so to the 
extent that this Court has held that a witness has no 
right to subscribe thereto unless he is first satisfied of 
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the testator's mental capacity. In Re Swan's Estate, 
supra. The legislature created the formality and with 
respect thereto this Court has said that where the for-
malities are prescribed a failure to comply therewith 
may not be excused even by demonstrating that a less 
stringent requirement would be as effective. In Re Alex-
ander's Estate, 104 Utah 286, 139 P. 2d 432. 
It is generally said to be the law that a complete 
attestation clause, reciting an observance of all statutory 
requirements, raises a presumption of the due execution 
of the will. 76 A.L.R. 617. The rigid formality of the 
execution and attestation of the will is necessary for 
the purpose of in1pressing the "actors" \Yith the serious-
ness of the situation and the integrity with which they 
1nust act. It is believed that the opinion herein has ob-
literated the sincerity and completely diluted the integrity 
of the testamentary acts. 
Judge Thurman, spe.aking In Re 8'lcan··s Estate, supra, 
set forth the status of the subscribing witnesses in the 
following language: 
"This testimony alone constitutes a prima 
facie case in favor of the testator's mental capa-
city. That, together \Yith the other facts testified 
to by then1 as to the testator having declared the 
instrument to be his "\Yilt and the "Titnesses having 
signed their names in his presence, and in the 
presence of earh other, constituted a prima facie 
case entitling the "\vill to probate. These men, as 
subscribing witnesses, filled the requirements of 
the law in every particular. Their relations to 
the testator were such as to render them capable 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
of judging of his mental capacity at the time of 
~ecuting the will. It was their duty to pass upon 
that qualification. They did pass upon it and 
found him mentally capable of executing ,a will 
and disposing of his property. It seems to us that 
a strict, fair, and honest application of the rule 
above referred to, having its foundation in the 
Constitution itself, and affirmed and reaffirmed 
over and over .again by the decisions of this court, 
ought to end the controversy, even at this point, 
without further reference to the evidence in the 
case." 
And in the same case, "\\'"here incidently a question of 
senile dementia was raised by the use of expert medical 
testimony, the Court on page 455 placed great weight 
on the testimony of subscribing witnesses who had known. 
the testator and had testified without the entertainment 
of any doubt respecting his mental capacity at the time 
the will was made, in spite of the fact that the testator 
was physically declining and that his once strong mind 
and intellect were slowly, but surely, beco,Jning enfeebled. 
In the instant case the subscribing witnesses were 
people such as characterized by the Court In Re Swan's 
Estate, supra, and neither entertained or expressed any 
doubt .as to the testatrix' mental competency. As in the 
Swan case, supra, this was not the only evidence of com-
petency and, as a matter of fact, except for the recollec-
tion of Dr. Copeland made from his notes as of 8 :00 
o'clock in the morning of the day of the execution of 
the codicil and the hypothetical testimony of Dr. Currier, 
there was no evidence of incompetency. The contestants 
testified that she w.as m~ntally competent. 
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It appears strange that the testimony of an ejXpert, 
speaking in terms of probability and who had never seen 
the testatrix in her lifetime, can overcome and destroy 
the constitutional and legislative edict relating to sub-
scribing witnesses. It is our belief that any will prepared 
by a person over the age of 60, this Court having now 
adjudicated such people as senile, is immediately tainted 
with invalidity if an expert, in response to a hypothetical 
question, can say that it would seem highly unlikely that 
such a person could make any decision of lasting or 
serious importance. 
As to subscribing witnesses the Court held: 
"First of all, in the instant case, it should 
be noted that the subscribing witnesses were not 
experts and their opinions were only those of lay 
persons and therefore should not be given undue 
weight." 
The Court cited in support of this In Re Hanson's Estate, 
87 Utah 580, 52 P. 2d 1103. We cannot find any state-
ment in that case which supports the Court. As .a matter 
of fact the case reaffirms In Re SzDan)s Estate, supra, 
which held at page 458 as follows : 
"The foregoing cases support the proposition 
that nonexpert "\Yitnesses are con1petent in cases 
of this kind, and many of then1 go so far as to 
hold that the testin1onY of "itnesses who were 
intimately acquainted ~1~th the deceased in his 
lifetime, and farniliar 'loith his n~ental conrditi-an 
at the time when the instrunzent was ea:ecuted, is 
entitled to greater weight than the testimony of 
med,ical experts who had no such acquaintance 
or knowledge of conditions.'-' (Emphasis added.) 
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The reference by the Court to the personal know-
ledge of the subscribing witnesses is interesting and it 
is noted that in the dissenting opinion Dr. Beatty's testi·-
mony on page 465 begins: "From my personal observa-
tions of Mr. Swan in his lifetime * * * ." It is hard to 
see how the instant case, In Re Swan's Estate and In Re 
Hanson's Estate, on the facts and on the law, can stand 
side by side. 
POINT II. 
'THE COURT IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE RULE THAT 
THE PREVAILING PARTIES ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE 
ALL OF 'THE EVIDEN,CE AND THE INFERENCES FAIRLY 
DRAWN VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO 
THEM. 
The statement is made in the opinion that the testat-
rix was stuporous while the subscribing witnesses were 
there. Such testimony was that ·of Dr. Copeland, an in-
terne, who was not one of the subscribing 'vitnesses and 
who had to refer to hospital records to refresh his 
memory (R. 235), which notation was made relating to 
a condition found at 8 :00 or 9 :00 o'clock in the morn-
ing (R. 258). And upon the inference that an in~'\-enous 
feeding at 2 :00 o'clock P.M., some six hours later, was 
proof that the testatrix was stuporous (R. 147). The 
only inference favorable or otherwise from this fact is 
that, the testatrix having said "I have some important 
business with these gentlemen," the doctor knew she was 
mentally fit to conduct such business. He certainly did 
not act to the contrary. If the decision herein is the law, 
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the jury can invalidate a will on the most nebulous of 
testimony. The word "stuporous" has many connotations. 
This Court in every decision relating to tesiltmentary 
capacity has stated the test to be whether or not the 
testatrix had sufficient mind and memory at the time of 
making the will to remember what were the natural ob-
jects of her bounty, to recall her property and dispose of 
it understandingly in accord with some plan. In Re 
Swan's Estate, supra, In Re Hanson's Estate, supra, In 
the Matter of t·he Estate of W·ilda Gail Swan, Deceased, 
______ Utah ______ , 293 P. 2d 682, and in the instant case the 
Court restated the rule, prefacing it with the remark 
that "all that is required is that one have sufficient 
mental capacity." 
In the testin1ony of Dr. Currier on direct examina-
tion, beginning at transcript p.age 320 to the end of the 
direct examination on page 333, evidence from the ex-
pert as to decedent's ability to remember her property, 
the natural objects of her bounty and her ability to dis-
pose of her property according to her plan were at-
teinpted to be elicited by contestants. Every question 
and answer was stricken because of uncertainty and be-
cause they had no probative Yalue. 
The prior decisions laid down by tlris Court cannot 
be interpreted to mean that testin1ony as to eompetency 
can be the 1nere ultimate conc.lusion of an expert, yet the 
Court now rules that such conclusions are admissible 
by stating: "that the collective result is that it would 
seem highly unlikely that the person could make any 
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decision of lasting or serious importance." This Court 
In Re Hanson's Estate, supra, at page 1116, stated: 
"Since the jury and no one else had the right 
to conclude as to whether she was incompetent 
to make a will, testimony that she was not so com-
petent must be ignored. Such testimony as to her 
being of 'unsound mind,' unable to 'transact busi-
ness,' or that she 'could not reason,' must all be 
measured and limited in its content by the under-
lying facts given in support of such impressions 
and in the light of all the other testimony. They 
are elastic phrases which may mean much or 
little, depending on the sense in which they are 
used and the contents with which invested." 
If any reliance may be had on that case, then is not the 
testimony of Dr. Currier to be ignored, and the testi-
mony of Dr. Copeland that Miss Richards was stuporous 
to be measured and limited by the underlying facts~ If 
such be the case, then this Court must reverse its opinion 
in the instant case or should specifically reverse In Re 
Hanson's Estate, supr.a. In the latter case, while it must 
be inferred that the finding of mental incapacity was 
sustained, the Court had great difficulty in spite of the 
fact that thirty separate facts were found by the Court, 
and on page 1117 there of it w.as stated: 
"By what has been brought out above, it 
amply appears that Marie's mind, even though 
it ·may not have lacked tesfflrnentary capacity, was 
one e.asily susceptible of being played upon. In 
the light of Marie's mental capacity and Dr. Mc-
Donald's conduct, there is ample evidence to sup-
port the finding of undue influence." (Emphasis 
added.) 
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We take it that the rule that the prevailing party is 
entitled to every intendment and inference fairly drawn 
from the evidence must be founded on the proposition 
that there is some evidence of incompetency. We submit 
that there is none. This Court has often stated that as 
the rule, but whether or not it feels bound in every in-
stance appears open to question. Hoyt et al. v. Wasatch 
Homes, Inc., 1 Utah 2d 9J 261 P. 2d 927. Kimball Elevator 
Co. v. Elevator Supplies Co., 2 Utah 2d 289, 272 P. 2d. 583. 
The decision herein is pointed in its failure to com-
ment upon the testimony of the subscribing witnesses and 
Joseph S. Jones, except that it was tainted with an in-
terest, and the testimony of Dr. Galligan, an eminent 
Physician and Surgeon with forty-three years of practice 
(R. 267), who had treated the decedent for twenty years 
(R. 267), and the testimony of the contestants. Assuming 
that by the use of the word "inference" it is meant "a 
process of reasoning hy 'vhich a fact or proposition sought 
to he established is deduced as a logical consequence from 
other facts or a state of facts already proved or ad-
mitted" (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition), can it 
he inferred: 
That "stuporous," b~~ logical eonsequence ,and 
ded uetion, n1eans n1en tal inc apaei ty ~ 
That •'it see1ns highly unlikely," b~~ logical 
eonsequence and deduction, 1neans 1nental incapa-
city1 
Assu1ning that the Court considered all of the evidence, 
what favor.able inferences can be deduced in favor of 
the prevailing parties 1 
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From the testimony of Dr. Galligan~ 
From the testimony of the subscribing witnesses~ 
From the testimony of the witness Joseph S. Jones~ 
From the testimony of the contestants themselves.~ 
We must assume none because the Court did not point 
to any of the testimony or suggest any inference favor-
able to the contestants. The testimony of all of the wit-
nesses who had personal observ.ation was positive and 
unequivocal that the testatrix was competent. Can it be 
that the basis of the decision is that the testatrix was 
seriously ill and suffering pain~ The only testimony in 
that regard is Dr. Gallig.an's statement that people dying 
of cancer for months, sometimes years, in an extreme 
state of physical exhaustion, were not mentally affected 
(R. 287). No inference favorable to the contestants can 
be drawn from such testimony. Of course, undue influ .. 
ence, while squinted at by the Court in the statement 
relating to "vindicating the propriety of their conduct," 
could not be the basis of the decision because the trial 
court refused to le~t that issue go to the jury. 
POINT III. 
'THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE OPIN-
IONS OF THE SUBSCRIBING WITNESSES AND OF AN 
ATTORNEY WERE NOT ENTITLED TO UNDUE WEIGHT. 
This Court held in the instant case: 
"Second, the witnesses have an interest in 
the outcome which always may be taken into con-
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sideration as a factor which may discount testi-
mony. This is not limited to where the witnesses 
are actual parties or have a direct pecuniary in-
terest, but in addition, there may he the case -
as here - where the witnesses (both connected 
with the executor, ·either as employees or counsel) 
have an interest by way of vindicating the pro-
priety of their conduct." 
Assuming that there is evidence in the record that 
Joseph S. Jones was an attorney for the executor, it is 
hard to visualize a situation more depreciating to a law-
yer than for the Supreme Court to say that he has no 
more knowledge than an untrained layman and therefore 
his testimony is not entitled to undue weight as to what 
constitutes mental capacity to make a will. The question 
can approp-riately be ,asked: Who has more knowledge 
and whose testimony should be given more weight on 
this question than a lawyerf In spite of the fact that 
he is an officer of the court and should be presumed to 
testify honestly, even in the absence of an oath, why 
should the Court affirn1 a jury finding and, in effect, 
say that he is not entitled to credit because he is a lay 
witness and is a member of the firm which represents 
the executor and a partner of the attorney· who drew the 
will and thereby has an interest in the outco1ne and would 
color his testi1nony because he "~as vindicating the pro-
priety of his conduct. If this is the ruling of the Court, 
thousands of wills will be declared invalid 1nerely be-
cause they vrere witnessed by ,a la,vyer in the san1e of-
fice as the one who drew the instrument. A reading of 
the testimony will show that the attorney witness was 
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m~iculous in his discussion with the testatrix so that 
when she signed he would have no doubt as to her capa-
city, otherwise he would not have signed. 
In Re Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P. 2d 602, the 
testator was seriously ill by reason of an operation and 
he wished to make a will. R. J. Douglas, an attorney of 
Ogden, Utah, was called in the evening to the hospital. 
He was told by the doctor that the man was seriously 
ill and in great pain. The testator's religious advisor 
was also present. Douglas drew the will and an interne 
and nurse witnessed it. As to the Priest the Court said : 
"It cannot be said that the witnesses were 
hostile, prejudiced, or biased, or that their testi-
mony was improbable. There is not anything in 
the record to show hostility. True, Father Ken-
nedy had an interest as executor, and was indi-
rectly interested because of his connection with 
the beneficiary, but that is not such an interest 
.as necessarily to make him hostile where no such 
attitude is apparent from the testimony." (Em-
phasis added.) 
It is not known vvhat the Court at that time thought of 
Mr. Douglas, but it did say on page 611: 
"Mr. Douglas is a lawyer of repute and many 
years, experience. Not anything is made to ap-
pear that would indic.ate he was hostile, pre-
judiced, or biased. His testimony is unimpeach-
ed.'' 
Referring to the bias and prejudice, the Court further 
st.a ted at page 607 : 
"Douglas had no interest whatever in the out-
come of the case. He performed his services, and 
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was paid therefor. The record does not disclose 
anything from which it might be inferred that 
he was anything but fair and impartial in his 
conduct or testimony." 
Mr. Jones is a lawyer of repute with considerable 
experience and would not color his testimony to vindicate 
the p·ropriety of his conduct. The testimony of Joseph 
S. Jones was unimpeached. Can the executor or any of 
its employees, counsel or otherwise he said to have as 
much of an interest as Father Kennedy in the Bryan 
case, supra. None of the witnesses for the proponent 
were to gain any part of the estate and the holding that 
they had an interest that would taint their testimony 
with bias and prejudice is not supported by the record. 
The contestants were the only witnesses who stood to 
gain yet none said she- was incompetent. It does not ap-
pear how In Re Bryan's Estate, supra, and the instant 
case can stand side by side. If the holding in the instant 
case is the intention of the Court, it should, in specific 
language, reverse In Re Bryan's Estate, supra. 
In the c.ase In tlze A.nlatter of the Estate of Wilda 
Gail Swan, Deceased, supra, this Court held that the at-
torney who drew the 'viii, and 'vas the beneficiary of a 
substantial part of the estate, 'vas the victim of a tech-
nical rule of la,v. This ease appears to be a complete 
turnabout, inferring bias in testimony of a law~~,.er for 
merely being a witness when he did not dra'v the will 
nor receive a bequest therefrom. 
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POINT IV. 
THE ·COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ADMISSIBLE CON-
JECTURAL TESTIMONY BY AN EXPERT NOT HAVING 
PERSONAL OBSERVATION AND ITS APPLICATION OF 
THE RULE AS TO THE BURDEN OF PROOF. 
In the ·matter of the Estate of Wilda Gail Swan, 
supra, the Court held that the contestant had the bur ... 
den of proof or persuading the trier of the fact that she 
lacked testamentary capacity. The Court concluded that 
in view of all the evidence the finding of the trial court 
that she lacked testamentary capacity "'Tas unreasonable 
.and must be reversed. The basis of the decision is that 
the evidence did not indicate that she could not remember 
the natural objects of her bounty or did not keep in mind 
her property or lacked the ability to dispose of it under-
standingly in accordance with some purpose or plan. In 
that case the bulk of the estate went to persons completely 
unrelated to the testatr1x and the only evidence of a plan 
was that she was unusually generous or improvident in 
making loans or gifts to friends, that she promised or 
suggested to various persons that she would make them 
beneficiaries under her will and that she ,asked her 
friends if they would like to manage her property. In 
the instant case the fact that the testatrix knew the 
natural objects of her bounty was perfectly obvious as 
they were the only ones who received a bequest. The 
quarrel is between those persons as to how much they 
should receive. Certainly the plan had at least as much 
substance as the indiscriminate beneficiaries in the Wilda 
Gail Swan case, supra, and was certainly disposed of 
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with at least as much understanding. The testimony of 
the subscribing witnesses in the Wilda Gail Swan case, 
supra, relating to competency was not as strong as the 
testimony in the instant case. Here the contestants even 
testified that they considered Miss Richards capable of 
handling her affairs, and this testimony was in the light 
of visits to the hospital before and after the execution of 
the codicil in question. Certainly the presumption spelled 
out by the Court in the Wilda Gail Swan case relating to 
undue influence is equally applicable to the presumption 
of mental capacity because the Court held that contest-
ants had the burden of persuading the trier of the fact. 
Why does the Court take the position in the instant 
case that the characterization as stuporous met the bur-
den of proof and persuading the trier of fact~ If that 
is justified, why in the face of more substantial evidence 
in the Wilda Gail Swan case, supra, did the Court reverse 
the finding of incompetency~ ''Te assume that in both 
eases the Court followed the rule that the party prevail-
ing below was entitled to have all of the evidence and 
every intendment and inference fairly drawn therefrom 
viewed in the light n1ost favorable to them. 
The Court in its opinion herein said: 
"Counsel further suggests that the answers of 
this expert were so uncertain and yague that they 
should not have be·en sub1nitted to the jury, citing 
Moore v. D. & R. G. '';· R. Co." (244 P. 2d 628, 
Utah). 
Couns-el does not recall arguing the l\loore case to the 
Court and it was .appended to the brief because the opin-
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ion had not been filed at the time the brief was printed. 
We believe the Court has overruled it in spite of the 
statement that counsel had erroneously interpreted the 
holding. In the Moore case, supra, the doctor had ex-
amined the patient, not for purposes of treatment but 
for the purpose of testifying in the c.ase. The Court 
therUn stated "the appellant argues that the testimony 
of the doctor, guarded in expression as it is and based 
in a large part on subjective symptoms related by re-
spondent, is insufficient to provide a question of e;xistence 
of an injured disc for the consideration of the jury, and 
hence the trial court erred in failing to instruct to that 
effect." In interpreting the language of the Court we 
have assumed that it is a fair statement to say that the 
expert in the 1\!Ioore case w.as testifying from personal 
observation. On the admissibility of this evidence the 
Court held: 
"This Court has long recognized that the 
mere use of words such as 'belief,' 'impression,' 
'probability,' or 'possibility' will not exclude a wit-
ness's testimony where his expression does not 
indicate a lack of personal observation, but merely 
the degree of positiveness of his original observa-
tion of the facts or the degree of positiveness of 
his recollection; * * * ." (Emphasis added.) 
The Court s.ays that we have interpreted this decision 
erroneously upon the ground that the testimony was 
inadmissible because of the use of words such as "be-
lief," "impression," "probability," or "possibility." That 
is not our interpretation of the case. We interpret the 
specific holding in the Moore case to be that where there 
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was persona.l observation the use of such words only goes 
to the recollection of the witness as to facts he observed. 
From the language of the Court that "the mere use of 
words such as 'belief,' 'impression,' 'probability,' or 
'possibility' " will not exclude a witness' testimony where 
his expression does not indicate a lack of personal obser-
vation," we interpret the holding to be that where the 
witness had no personal observation and is, therefore, 
not recalling what he observed, that the testimony is in-
admissible. Our interpretation is based upon whether 
or not the witness had personal observation. If the Moore 
case cannot be interpreted as we contend, then why did 
the Court use language referring to personal observa-
tion~ Counsel, in attempting to analyze decisions, must 
read vvhat is written and cannot risk assuming that the 
expressions of the Court are redundant, surplusage or 
inadvertent. If the instant case holds that testimony, 
not based on personal observation, qualified by "highly 
unlikely," or "I would expect," or "I suppose" is ad-
missible, then this Court should specifically state that 
JJ1oore v. D. & R. G. W. R. Co. is overruled or modified. 
The testimony of Dr. Currier raises a further ques-
tion. At best it is supposition and conjecture. It only 
affords a choice of probabilities. One is that it would 
seen1 highly unlikely that the person could make any 
decisions of lasting or serious importance. The other 
probability is obvious, that it would seem likel)~ that the 
person could make .a decision of lasting or serious im-
portance. This Court has held that a jury verdict ean-
not stand on a basis of conjecture in a civil case where 
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a mere preponderance is the rule and no presump~tion re-
quiring the burden of persuasion was present. In .Al-
verado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d. 16, 268 P. 2d. 986, this 
Court held: 
"The burden was upon plaintiff to prove the 
charge of speeding; such a finding of fact could 
not be based on mere speculation or conjecture, 
but only on a preponderance of the evidence. This 
means the greater weight of the evidence, or as 
sometimes stated, such degree of proof that the 
greater probability of truth lies therein. A choice 
of probabilities does not meet this requirement. 
It creates only a basis for conjecture, on which 
a veTdict of the jury cannot stand." 
CONCLUSION 
We believe that the principle of law laid down by 
the Court relating to mental competency is proper, but 
we contend that the principle as to subscribing witnes-
ses, the interest they might have by reason of being con-
nected with the executor, and the principle relating to 
the weight of lay witnesses and attorneys, and the prin-
ciple relating to the admissibility of conjectural testi-
mony, is contrary to the precedents affirmed and re-
affirmed over and over again by this Court. In Re Latsis' 
Estate, 3 -utah 2d 365 284 P. 2d 479, this Court on rehear-
ing stated: 
"Though we need make no modification in 
the legal principles enunciated, we find it neces-
sary to reconsider our construction of the facts 
to which the principles are applied." 
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While we are without the benefit of numerous amici 
curiae, as in the Latsis case, we respectfully urge that 
the decision herein departs from well established pre-
cedents and casts a shadow of invalidity on a substan-
tial number of wills yet to be probated. We ask that the 
Court reconsider the legal principles enunciated and re-
consider its construction of the facts to the legal prin-
ciples as they might be re-examined. We believe serious 
error has been committed, but in any event a rehearing 
should be granted if only to rationalize this case with 
previous decisions of the Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS, MATTSSON 
& EVANS 
Attorneys for Proponent 
and Appellant 
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